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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETER VOS, JR., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IML FREIGHT, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In his exwnplaint (R. 36-38) plaintiff and appellant, 
Peter Vos, Jr., hereinafter called appellant, seeks to re-
cover damages and reinstatement to his employment with 
defendant and respondent, IML Freight, Inc., hereinafter 
called IML, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged 
by IML in breach of the collective bargaining agreement 
between IML and appellant's Union. Contrary to the 
assertions in his brief, appellant's complaint did not seek 
punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a hearing on June 18, 1974, the District Court 
granted IML's motion for summary judgment (R. 18), 
and thereafter made and entered its judgment of dis-
ease No. 
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missal (R. 5, 6) dismissing appellant's complaint with 
prejudice and upon the merits. -£ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In this appeal IML, as respondent, seeks affirmance 
of the District Court's judgment of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the Statement of Facts set forth in appel-
lant's brief is reasonably accurate, it does include several 
mis-statements and conclusions. Accordingly, IML sub-
mits the following Statement of Facts which facts are 
dearly established by the pleadings (R. 32-38); IML's 
Requests for Admissions (R. 28-31) and appellant's re-
sponses thereto (R. 22-24); and the affidavit of Arthur 
H. Bunte, Jr. (R. 19-21). 
Appellant was formerly employed by IML as an over-
the-road driver domiciled at Salt Lake City, Utah. His 
principal job was driving IML's diesel powered tractors, 
pulling trailers in the interstate transportation of freight. 
[Such tractors are equipped with "sleeper cabs," and are 
dispatched with two drivers, so that one can sleep while 
the other drives. Appellant was not a taxi or "cab" driver 
as might be inferred from the language in his brief.] 
The terms and conditions of appellant's employment 
with IML were governed by the provisions of two collec-
tive bargaining agreements known as the 1970-1973 Na-
tional Master Freight Agreement, hereinafter called the 
National Master, and the Western States Area Over-the-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Road Motor Freight Supplemental Agreement, herein-
after called the OTR Supplement (R. 35). These agree-
ments resulted from collective bargaining on a nation-
wide basis between the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters and the trucking industry. Appellant was a 
member of and was represented by Teamsters Local 222 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, which Local Union was 
also subject to and bound by said labor agreements. 
IML terminated appellant's employment by a writ-
ten notice dated June 4, 1973, addressed to appellant 
which reads as follows: 
This letter will serve to advise you that you are 
hereby terminated from the services of IML 
Freight, Inc. 
Your termination stems from your refusal to 
accept a 03:00 Cincinnati dispatch on June 2, 
1973, during the regular call time from 17:00 to 
19:00 on June 1st. 
This termination follows a previous warning let-
ter of October 20, 1972, for not accepting a call 
for an East run on October 18,1972. (R. 31, em-
phasis added.) 
A copy of the discharge letter was sent by IML to appel-
lant's Union as required by Article 46, Section 2(b), page 
21, of the OTR Supplement. 
Appellant caused his Local Union to protest his dis-
charge through the grievance machinery contained in the 
OTR Supplement. Pursuant to that protest a hearing was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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held on June 14,1973, before the Utah-Idaho Joint State 
Committee, the appropriate committee to hear such pro-
test as established under Article 44, Section 1, page 13, 
of the OTR Supplement. That committee was unable 
reach a decision and deadlocked on the protest. There-
after, appellant's Local Union caused said deadlocked 
protest to be filed with the Joint Western Area Com-
mittee as Case No. 8-73-8001 on the August, 1973, agenda 
of that committee. The Joint Western Area Committee 
is the appropriate committee to hear such deadlocked 
protests as established under Article 44, Section 2, page 
14, of the OTR Supplement. 
On or about August 13, 1973, a hearing was held on 
said deadlocked protest before the Joint Western Area 
Committee in San Francisco, California. Appellant ap-
peared in person and participated in said hearing and 
was also represented by Fred W. Hamilton, the Secretary 
Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer of his Local Union, 
and also by Cecil Sainsbury, a Business Representative 
of his Local Union. Following the hearing the parties 
were excused and the committee, in executive session, 
by majority vote ruled in favor of IML and against the 
appellant and upheld the discharge. 
Thereafter, on or about February 19, 1974, appellant 
filed his complaint in the Third District Court seeking 
damages and reinstatement to his employment, alleging 
that his discharge was without just cause and in breach 
of the labor agreement (R. 36-38). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT IS BOUND BY THE DECI-
SION OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE 
WHICH UPHELD HIS DISCHARGE, AND 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR 
AGREEMENT AND UNDER APPLICABLE 
LAW HE CANNOT RELITIGATE THE MER-
ITS OF THAT DISCHARGE. 
An employer has the right to discharge an employee 
ait any time, and for any reason or no reason, except in-
sofar as that common law right has been restricted by 
statute or by contract. Since there is no statutory re-
striction involved in this case, the question of whether 
or not IML's discharge of appellant was proper depends 
upon the provisions of the labor agreements involved. See 
Held vs. American Linen Supply Co., (Utah 1957), 6 Ut. 
2d 106, 307 P. 2d 210. 
Article 46, Section 1, page 21, of the OTR Supple-
ment provides that IML cannot discharge except for 
"just cause/' and further provides that except for four 
specified offenses, none of which is applicable here, a 
prior written warning must be given. It should be noted 
that the termination letter (R. 31) specified the reason 
— refusing a dispatch, and also noted a prior written 
warning for the same offense. We submit that when ap-
pellant protested his discharge, the proper forum for de-
termining the merits thereof — whether or not the facts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and circumstances constituted "just cause" — was the 
grievance machinery provided in the labor agreement. 
Article 44 of the OTR Supplement provides for the 
establishment of the grievance committees. Then Article 
45 spells out the procedure as follows: 
The Union and the Employers agree that there 
shall be no strike, lockout, tie-up or legal pro-
ceedings without first using all possible means of 
settlement as provided for in this Agreement and 
in the National Agreement if applicable, of any 
controversy which might arise. Disputes shall 
be taken up between the Employer and the Local 
Union involved. Failing adjustment by these 
parties, the following procedure shall then ap-
ply: 
(a) Where a Joint State Committee by a ma-
jority vote settles a dispute no appeal may be 
taken to the Joint Western Area Committee. 
Such a decision will be final and binding on both 
parties. 
(b) Where a Joint State Committee is unable 
to agree or come to a decision on a case, it shall 
at the request of the Union or the Employer in-
volved, be filed with the Joint Western Area 
Committee at the next regularly constituted 
session. Where the Joint Western Area Com-
mittee by majority vote settles a dispute such de-
cision shall be final and binding on both parties 
with no further appeal. (Article 45, Section 
1(a) and (b), page 16, emphasis added.) 
Under applicable labor law the decision of the Joint 
Western Area Committee upholding his discharge was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and is the end of the road for appellant, He may not re-
litigate the merits in court. 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947 (29 U. S. C. § 185) authorizes suits for breach 
of labor agreements to be brought in federal courts. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that Section 301 
does not oust state courts of jurisdiction in such suits, 
Charles Dowd Box Co. vs. Courtney, (U. S. Sup. Ct. 
1962), 368 U. S. 502, 82 S. Ct. 519, 49 LRRM 2619. How-
ever, state courts hearing such breach of contract actions 
must apply federal law. Teamsters Local 174 vs. Lucas 
Flour Co., (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1962), 369 U. S. 95, 82 S. Ct. 
571, 49 LRRM 2717. 
The Labor Management Relations Ad ai li*4i" also 
provides that: 
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by 
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable 
method for settlement of grievance disputes aris-
ing over the application or interpretation of an 
existing collective bargaining agreement. * * * 
(29 U. S. C. § 173.) 
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court decided three 
cases (the so-called Trilogy) which dealt with problems 
of resolving grievances through arbitration as provided 
in collective bargaining agreements. Those cases held 
that questions of interpretation and application of the 
labor agreement should be determined through the arbi-
tration procedures of the labor agreement, and that the 
courts should not delve into the merits of the grievances. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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See United Steel Workers of America vs. American Man-
ufacturing Company, (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1960), 363 U. S. 
564, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 80 S. Ct. 1343; United Steel Work-
ers of America vs. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Com-
pany, (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1960), 363 U. S. 574, 4 L. Ed. 2d 
1409, 80 S. Ct. 1347; United Steel Workers of America 
vs. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., (U. S. Sup. Ct. 
1960), 363 U. S. 593, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424, 80 S. Ct. 1358. 
In the Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company case, 
supra, the court said: 
The collective bargaining agreement states the 
rights and duties of the parties. I t is more than 
a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a 
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot 
wholly anticipate. * * * The collective 
agreement covers the whole employment rela-
tionship. I t calls into being a new common law 
— the common law of a particular industry or of 
a particular plant. * * * (4 L. Ed. 2d at 
page 1415). But the grievance machinery under 
a coUective bargaining agreement is at the very 
heart of the system of industrial self-government. 
* * * The processing of disputes through the 
grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by 
which meaning and content are given to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. (4 L. Ed. 2d at 
pages 1416,1417.) 
Decisions of grievance committees established pur-
suant to the labor agreement are as binding and en-
forceable on the parties as an arbitrator's award. See 
General Drivers Union Local 89 vs. Riss & Co., (U. S. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Sup. Ct. 1963), 372 U. S. 517, 9 L. Ed. 2d 918, 83 S. Ct. 
789, where the court, in referring to the decision of a joint 
grievance committee established under a labor agreement 
with the Teamsters Union (substantially similar to the 
Joint Western Area Committee herein involved), said: 
* * * It is not enough that the word "arbi-
tration" does not appear in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, for we have held that the 
policy of the Labor Act "can be effectuated only 
if the means chosen by the parties for settlement 
of their differences under a collective bargaining 
agreement is given full play." [citing cases.] 
Thus, if the award at bar is the chosen instru-
ment for the definitive settlement of grievances 
under the agreement, it is enforceable under 
§ 301. And if the Joint Area Cartage Com-
mittee's award is thus enforceable, it is not open 
to the courts to re-weigh the merits of the griev-
ance. (9 L. Ed. 2d 920, emphasis added.) 
See also Humphrey vs. Moore, (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1964), 375 
U. S. 335, 11 L. Ed. 2d 370, 84 S. Ct. 363, where the court 
said that "the decision of the committee, reached after 
proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and 
binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is." 
(11 L. Ed. 2d 382, 383, citing Drivers Union vs. Riss & 
Co., supra.) 
Appellant's protest to his discharge 1ms been pro-
cessed in the regular manner through the grievance ma-
chinery provided in the collective bargaining agreement 
(the OTR Supplement) and appellant, who lost there, is 
not entitled to rehear the grievance in the courts. See 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Haynes vs. U. S. Pipe and Foundry Co., (C. A. 5th 1966), 
362 F. 2d 414, where the court, in affirming the trial 
court's dismissal of a suit for wrongful discharge, said: 
* * * This is a run-of-the-mine case where 
the grievance procedure was followed and the ad-
verse decision against appellant became final. 
Being dissatisfied, he sought to start anew in the 
face of the bar of the final decision under the 
grievance procedure. This he may not do under 
the current status of federal labor law as we 
understand it. (362 F. 2d 418, emphasis added.) 
Accord: Guille vs. Mushroom Transportation Co., (Sup. 
Ot of Penn. 1967), 229 A. 2d 903. 
POINT II. 
SINCE THERE WAS NO ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT, THE DISTRICT COURT 
WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING IML'S MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The District Court properly granted IML's motion 
for summary judgment since it is undisputed that the 
Joint Western Area Committee ruled in favor of IML 
and against appellant, and there is no allegation or show-
ing of fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. See Price vs. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters and Eastern Express, 
Inc., (C. A. 3rd 1972), 457 F. 2d 605, where the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of a summary 
judgment against the plaintiff in a suit challenging a 
decision of the National Grievance Committee established 
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under the National Master Freight Agreement. The 
court said: 
Because the decision then was appropriately re-
served for the judgment of the Joint Committee, 
the result it reached will not be overturned un-
less dishonest, capricious, or beyond its authority 
under the collective bargaining agreement, [cit-
ing cases, including Riss & Co., supra.] 
* * * While the procedure for handling griev-
ances in the trucking industry does not include 
an outside party as the final arbitrator, thereby 
leaving the Committee open to charges of fav-
oring the side to which it gives relief, this mech-
anism has been approved by the courts repeat-
edly f citing cases, including Riss & Co. and 
Humphrey v. Moore, supra]. (457 F. 2d 611.) 
Accord: Smith vs. Yellow Freight System, Inc., (U. S. 
D. C, N. D. Ohio 1972), 79 LRRM 3079, P. Supp. 
; Albert vs. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, (U. S. 
D. C, S. D. West Va., 1972), 80 LRRM 2919, F. 
Supp. ; Donley vs. Motor Freight Express, Inc., (U. 
S. D. C, W. D. Penn. 1972), 344 F. Sup. 290, 
LRRM 
In Hines vs. Local 377, Teamsters, (U. S. D. C, N. D. 
Ohio 1973) 84 LRRM 2649, F. Supp , the court en-
tered a summary judgment against several disgruntled 
plaintiffs who were attempting to litigate the same griev-
ances which they lost before a joint grievance committee. 
The court said: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In response to defendants' motions for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs assert that it is improper 
for this court to grant such motions when there 
is an issue of intent in question, specifically, the 
bad faith of the Union. This court cannot agree. 
The logical implications of such an argument 
would entitle any aggrieved employee to appeal 
a decision by an arbitrator by merely asserting 
that there was bad faith on the part of the Un-
ion's representation. Such an issue would always 
be denied, and thus there would always be an 
issue of bad faith before the court. 
This court is of the opinion that plaintiffs' ac-
tions are first beared by the doctrine of finality 
in arbitration awards; and secondly, is (sic) 
barred for failure to show facts comprising bad 
faith, arbitrariness or perfunctoriness on the part 
of the Unions. * * * (84 LRRM at page 
2650, emphasis added.) 
In Smith vs. Yellow Freight System, Inc., supra, the 
court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment 
where the plaintiffs sought to overturn a decision of a 
joint grievance committee established under the National 
Master Freight Agreement and the Central States Area 
Supplements thereto. As to the question of bad faith 
the court said: 
First, the cause of action attempted to be as-
serted therein may only be maintained based 
upon arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith ac-
tions of the collective bargaining agent, [citing 
cases.] The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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held that a complaint alleging such a breach 
must contain more than conclusory statements, 
and must state facts reflecting an attitude of 
"hostile discrimination" [citing cases.] The in-
stant complaints do not meet those standards. 
(79 LRRM at page 3080, emphasis added.) 
Nowhere in his complaint (R. 36-38) has appellant 
alleged fraud, dishonesty, or bad faith. Accordingly, there 
is no issue in that regard. Although in his brief (Point 
V at page 10) appellant asserts that his Union failed 
to properly represent him, the only support in the rec-
ord for that assertion is that the grievance committee 
ruled against him. The law does not require that the 
Union must win all of its grievance cases. The United 
States Supreme Court spelled out the test in Vaca vs. 
Sipes, (U. S. Sup. a . 1967), 386 U. S. 171, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
842, 87 S. Ct. 903, 64 LRRM 2369: 
A breach of the statutory duty of fair represen-
tation occurs only when a union's conduct to-
ward a member of the collective bargaining unit 
is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in had faith. (87 
S. C5t. at page 916.) 
Appellant's affidavit (R. 10-12) clearly does not meet 
the tests as laid down by this Court in Walker vs. Rocky 
Mountain Recreation Corporation, (Utah 1973), 29 Ut. 
2d 274, 508 P. 2d 538 and cannot be used to set up an 
issue of fair representation, particularly when that theory 
was never pleaded. 
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POINT III. 
THE CASE OF PEARSON VS. ANDERBURG 
IS NOT IN POINT AND HAS NO APPLICA-
BILITY TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
Appellant cites and relies upon the 1905 decision of 
this Court in Pearson vs. Anderburg, (Utah 1905), 28 
Utah 495, 50 Pac. 307. In that case the Court held that 
an agreement to resolve a future dispute through non-
judicial procedures to the exclusion of the courts was 
invalid. See also Latter vs. Holsum Bread Co., (Utah 
1945), 108 Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421, where this Court 
applied the same principle in a labor case. We submit 
that these cases have no application to the case at bar, 
for two reasons: First, the appellant followed the non-
judicial procedure of the grievance machinery and com-
plained only when he lost. Second, federal labor law is 
directly contrary to the Pearson and Latter oases as in-
dicated by the authorities cited above, and federal labor 
law is controlling in the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has contended that he was discharged by 
IML without just cause in violation of terms and condi-
tions of the labor agreement. The question of whether 
or not that discharge was proper under the labor agree-
ment was submitted to the grievance madiinery estab-
lished in the labor agreement and appellant lost. Under 
the undisputed facts and applicable law, appellant, after 
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losing has case under the grievance machinery, cannot 
litigate the merits of his discharge in the courts. There 
was no issue of material fact presented and the District 
Court correctly granted IMI/s motion for summary judg-
ment. That ruling should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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